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PARADOX AND THE NEGOTIATION OF TENSIONS IN 
GLOBALLY DISTRIBUTED WORK 
Abstract  
Tensions are a major source of communication problems, coordination issues and conflict in 
globally distributed work (GDW). In this paper we argue that extant literature falls short of 
addressing tensions in GDW at two levels. First, it fails to fully account for the intrinsic and 
entrenched nature of tensions in GDW, suggesting instead that they can be resolved or made 
to disappear. Second, it does not examine the key interactions amongst different kinds of 
tensions. Drawing on qualitative data from a distributed finance organization and applying 
concepts from paradox theory, we show how globally distributed units negotiate knowledge, 
power and identity tensions in collaborative work. The findings illuminate how a sequential 
enactment of both formal and informal solutions can better address tensions and generate 
collaborative opportunities in GDW. Building on the findings, we develop a phasal model of 
tension evolution and management in GDW which explains how tensions evolve from a phase 
of suppression through to a phase of attenuation. We demonstrate the interactions of 
knowledge-power-identity tensions against a background of defensive, interactive and 
collaborative behaviors, and suggest several practical implications for GDW practice.  
Keywords:  
Paradox, Globally Distributed Work, Case Study Research 
Introduction 
Organizations rely on globally distributed work (GDW) to take advantage of complementary 
objectives. In typical arrangements, highly skilled onshore teams focus on strategy and 
customer interactions, while offshore teams focus on repetitive back-office activities, reducing 
costs and improving efficiencies. Individually, each side can operate within the scope of their 
own tasks, priorities and values. However, when they are required to collaborate on distributed 
processes, tensions stemming from inherent contradictions in the working relationship cause 
strain and discomfort to both sides (Barney et al., 2014).    
The extant literature recognizes three main sources of tensions in GDW: knowledge 
asymmetries (Vlaar et al., 2008; Hahl et al., 2016); power asymmetries (Levina and Vaast, 
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2008; Ravishankar et al., 2013); and identity threats (Petriglieri 2011; Koppman et al., 2016)1. 
Collectively, these tensions can create communication problems (Levina and Vaast 2008; 
Hinds et al 2014), coordination issues (Oshri et al., 2008; Kotlarsky et al., 2014) and 
diminished opportunities for learning and innovation (Levina and Vaast, 2008; Tzabbar and 
Vestal, 2015). Tensions have also been found to reduce willingness to collaborate (Zimmerman 
and Ravishankar, 2014) and induce value-destroying conflict (Hinds and Mortensen, 2005; 
Ravishankar, 2015).  
Much of the literature has focused on formal strategies for resolving and eliminating 
tensions. For instance, studies have found that codifying information helps reduce reliance on 
undocumented contextual knowledge (Leonardi and Bailey 2008; Oshri et al., 2008), and that 
brokering helps reduce knowledge silos (Leonardi and Bailey, 2008; 2013; Hahl et al., 2016). 
Research has also found that contracts play an important role in clearer distribution of power 
and responsibility (Di Tullio and Staples, 2013), while training programs, reassignment of 
tasks, and joint selection and promotion systems help readdress status imbalances (Levina and 
Vaast, 2008; Ravishankar et al., 2013). Similarly, cultural intermediaries such as ‘inpatriates’ 
who transcend subgroup differences help ease identity threats (Eisenberg and Mattarelli, 2016).  
Despite the strengths of this body of research, two important issues are yet to be 
addressed. First, there is an implicit assumption in extant research that tensions between parties 
engaged in collaborative GDW can always be permanently resolved. However, this assumption 
fails to account for the intrinsic and entrenched nature of tensions in GDW, given the inherently 
contradictory aspects of many onshore-offshore relationships. In contradictory and inherently 
paradoxical settings, notwithstanding efforts targeting them, tensions are known to persist 
(Smith and Lewis, 2011). A key consequence of this preoccupation with permanent resolution 
is the limited focus on the process of generating meaningful collaborations within an 
entrenched system of onshore-offshore tensions. Second, prior research does not consider the 
interactions amongst different kinds of tensions and their implications for collaborative 
outcomes. Consequently, it remains unclear how successful collaborations are accomplished 
when multiple tensions are at play. In this paper, we respond to these two gaps in scholarship 
by addressing two specific research questions:  
• RQ1: How are tensions in GDW turned into collaborative opportunities? 
• RQ2: How do knowledge, power, and identity tensions relate to one another?  
 
1 We use the terms knowledge tensions, power tensions and identity tensions to refer to the corresponding tensions. 
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Drawing on an in-depth qualitative case study of a distributed finance organization, we apply 
ideas from paradox theory (Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011) and offer an alternative 
approach to understanding tensions in GDW. The notion of paradox suggests that tensions are 
not permanently resolved in the traditional sense because leaning towards one polarity (such 
as cost reduction and efficiency) puts increasing pressure on the other polarity (such as quality 
and innovation) (Lewis, 2000; Smith et al., 2017). When applied to GDW settings, the paradox 
perspective helps us see that the successful implementation of collaborative GDW projects 
require managerial action and solutions different from the formal ones typically highlighted in 
the literature. Our findings suggest that defensive behaviors and attempts to force one side’s 
preferred position may continue even after the implementation of formal solutions aimed at 
addressing tensions. While such behaviors strain interactions and result in a period of conflict, 
the findings show how subsequent informal managerial action can be central to improved 
mutual understanding and new collaborative ways of working.  
Our study makes three contributions to research. First, we extend current debate in 
GDW, which mainly emphasizes the importance of formal solutions in managing tensions. Our 
findings point to the need for more sophisticated and nuanced solutions in the management of 
persistent and inter-related GDW tensions. Through the paradox lens, we demonstrate how a 
sequential enactment of both formal and informal solutions, rather than simple formal solutions 
(e.g. structural separation of the paradoxical units), can better address tensions and generate 
collaborative opportunities. Second, we develop a phasal model which explains how tensions 
evolve from a phase of suppression through to a phase of attenuation. It further describes and 
details the characteristics of specific behaviors associated with each phase. Third, we extend 
prior research by empirically illustrating the interactions of knowledge-power-identity tensions 
in GDW. In particular, we elucidate how these interactions unfold against a background of 
defensive and interactive-collaborative behaviors. These interactions suggest that structural 
changes in GDW can immediately amplify power and identity tensions. They also show how 
efforts to manage some tensions can impact a different type of tension in collaborative GDW. 
In the following sections, we review the literature on GDW with a specific focus on tensions 
and introduce paradox as an appropriate theoretical perspective. Next, we provide a detailed 
account of the methodology and case analysis. Finally, we discuss the paper’s main theoretical 
and practical implications.   
Tensions in GDW 
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Globally distributed work (GDW) involves the demarcation and division of work into dispersed 
task specific work units in order to enable innovative ideas (Levina and Vaast, 2008; Eisenberg 
and Mattarelli, 2016) as well as cost savings (Dibbern et al., 2008). The success of GDW 
mainly depends on the ability and willingness of onshore and offshore units to collaborate on 
distributed processes. It follows that variations in such ability and willingness create tensions 
between the two sides. The extant GDW literature finds there are three prominent sources of 
tensions at play: knowledge asymmetries, power asymmetries, and identity threats (Table 1). 
Knowledge asymmetries refer to the imbalance of knowledge and experience (Oshri et al., 
2008; Vlaar et al., 2008) in performing specialized tasks (Tiwana and Keil, 2007; Leonardi and 
Bailey, 2013). Offshore units have been criticized for possessing only a limited knowledge of 
the onshore business and therefore contributing to poor organizational performance (Vlaar et 
al., 2008; Barney et al., 2014). For instance, Barney et al. (2014) found offshore Indian 
software engineers lacking in domain knowledge, leading to misunderstanding of 
requirements. On the other hand, onshore units have been criticized for information hiding 
(Connelly et al., 2012; Zimmerman and Ravishankar, 2014) and for not understanding offshore 
processes (Tiwana and Keil, 2007; Cha et al., 2008). Unmanaged knowledge asymmetries can 
hinder effective communication, reduce understanding (Levina and Vaast, 2008), limit positive 
knowledge spillover and reduce opportunities for joint problem solving (Jarvenpaa and 
Majchrzak, 2016). Firms invest in formal structures and systems to reduce knowledge tensions. 
Rules, standard operating procedures, codified directories and common lexicon are used to 
overcome gaps in knowledge (Oshri et al., 2008) and carefully designed structural 
arrangements help restrict the scope of collaborations, limit the need for knowledge sharing, 
and mitigate the opportunity for conflict (Oxley and Sampson, 2004).  
Power asymmetries in GDW stem from imbalanced access to resources and decision 
makers, allowing some parts of the organization to enjoy a higher status than others (Levina 
and Vaast, 2008; Ravishankar et al., 2013; Hahl et al., 2016). In general, research has found 
that power resides in onshore units that control structural resources (Levina and Kane, 2009; 
Ravishankar et al., 2013). Levina and Kane (2009) found that onshore teams are well connected 
to senior decision makers and have better access to budgets, training and technology. Onshore 
units also assume a higher status on account of their perceived advanced language skills and 
qualifications (Hinds et al., 2014), engagement with higher-value tasks and superior domain 
expertise (Levina and Vaast, 2008). More recent research suggests that in knowledge intensive 
collaborations, it is difficult to determine ‘who owns the code’, decipher where decision- 
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making power should reside and evaluate how rewards should be distributed (Chen et al., 2017; 
Parker et al., 2017). Organizations draft unambiguous contracts (Dibbern et al., 2008; Parker 
et al., 2017), legalize ownership of intellectual property and formalize the distribution of power 
via clearer documentation of responsibilities (Parker et al., 2017) to mitigate and manage the 
harmful impact of power asymmetries. Studies also indicate that service level agreements 
(SLAs) help formalize expectations and reduce power-related task conflicts (Goo et al., 2009; 
Deloitte, 2016). 
Table 1: Review of sources of tensions in globally distributed work 
Source Offshore Team Onshore Team Avoid tensions through: Reference 
Knowledge 
asymmetries 
Possess 
knowledge 
specific to 
migrated 
activities; 
have limited 
business/domain 
knowledge. 
Possess 
business, 
domain specific 
knowledge; 
have 
less 
understanding of 
offshore 
activities. 
− Standardization 
and 
decontextualizing 
of information. 
− Formal 
communication 
channels. 
Dibbern et 
al., 2008; 
Oshri et al., 
2008; Vlaar 
et al., 2008; 
Hahl et al., 
2016  
Power 
asymmetries 
Less access to 
resources and 
limited decision-
making power. 
Excellent access 
to resources; 
possess 
decision- 
making powers. 
− Service level 
agreements, 
standard operating 
procedures and 
statement of work 
documents that 
outline 
expectations, 
assign decision- 
making authority 
and distribute 
rewards and 
penalties. 
− Contract 
management and 
codifying 
processes.  
Levina and 
Vaast, 2008; 
Ravishankar 
et al., 2013;  
Zimmerman 
and 
Ravishankar, 
2014; 
Tzabbar and 
Vestal, 2015 
Identity 
threats 
Believe they are 
perceived as less 
important by the 
onshore side; feel 
their 
organizational 
identity is being 
threatened. 
Experience 
threat of further 
transfer of tasks 
to the offshore 
side; feel their 
professional and 
organizational 
− Cultural training. 
− Cultural brokers  
− Frames and 
narratives to avoid 
conflict. 
David et al., 
2008; 
Zimmerman 
and 
Ravishankar, 
2011; 
Eisenberg 
and 
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Identity threats in the GDW context typically involve experiences that potentially violate an 
individual’s or group’s sense of professional self (Petriglieri, 2011; Koppman et al., 2016). 
Onshore identities are prone to threats as service offshoring matures, leading to migration of 
complex tasks (Zimmerman and Ravishankar, 2014; 2016) and increasing need for cross-
cultural interactions to accomplish the said tasks (Petriglieri, 2011). On the other side, research 
has shown how offshore units’ sense of identity and organizational membership are threatened 
when they are treated as subordinates by their onshore counterparts (Leonardi and Rodriguez-
Lluesma, 2013; Koppman et al., 2016). In a study of German-Indian teams, Zimmerman and 
Ravishankar (2011) showed how offshore Indian engineers who considered themselves to be 
skilled professionals experienced significant identity threats when their onshore German 
colleagues assigned them repetitive and less interesting tasks.  
Identity threats can give rise to a plethora of undesirable effects, including poor 
performance (Ravishankar, 2015), resistance to change (Zimmerman and Ravishankar, 2011), 
stigmatization (Major and O’Brien, 2005) and reluctance to share knowledge (Zimmerman and 
Ravishankar, 2011; Eisenberg and Mattarelli, 2016). Organizations have sought to resolve 
identity threats using cultural training (Newell et al., 2007; David et al., 2008) and 
intermediaries (or ‘inpatriates’), who transcend cultural differences between subgroups and 
work to create a strong sense of identification with the larger organization (Eisenberg and 
Mattarelli, 2016). A small number of studies also show how more informal approaches such as 
framing narratives can be used strategically to resolve identity threats and temporarily reduce 
conflict in GDW (Petriglieri, 2011; Ravishankar, 2015).  
A paradox perspective 
Often described as ‘two sides of the same coin’, paradox is a condition where two individual 
elements are interrelated and necessary to each other’s existence (Smith and Lewis, 2011), and 
yet seem to be opposing or contradictory (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; Smith and Lewis, 
2011). The tensions created by the pull of two paradoxical elements are not easily resolved 
since leaning towards one puts increasing pressure on the other (Lewis, 2000; Smith et al., 
2017). In business and management research, the notion of paradox has been used to examine 
identity is being 
threatened. 
Mattarelli, 
2016; 
Koppman et 
al., 2016  
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contradictory elements such as competition and cooperation in organizational alliances (Rai, 
2016), exploitation of existing resources and exploration of new ideas in innovative projects 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009), and novelty and usefulness in creative endeavors (Miron-
Spektor and Beenen, 2015). Within the IS literature, studies have considered paradoxical 
contradictions between control and autonomy in self-managing teams (Druskat and Wheeler, 
2003), control and empowerment in hybrid teams (Cousins et al., 2007), flexibility and structure 
in client-supplier innovation projects (Kotlarsky et al., 2016), and trust and mistrust in 
distributed teams (Zolin et al., 2004). Paradox brings into sharp focus the role of behaviors in 
heightening or relieving tensions created by the opposing elements. Paradox posits that 
defensive behaviors such as avoiding differences or forcing one-sided solutions may only 
provide temporary relief (Smith and Lewis, 2011). In fact, they can create vicious reinforcing 
cycles that perpetuate and intensify tensions (Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011). For 
example, individuals may defensively retreat to their own divisions and stop engaging with 
partners, worsening the tensions in collaborative-competitive relationships (Jarzabkowski et al. 
2013); offshore teams may defend contradictory elements in offshoring as ‘cultural 
differences’, further amplifying tensions (Ravishankar, 2015).   
The literature suggests two broad formal strategies for managing paradoxes (Poole and 
Van de Ven, 1989; Lewis, 2000). The first, separation-based strategy, involves demarcating 
and honoring conflicting elements. For instance, distinctive formal structures can create much 
needed physical and temporal separation between tension-elevating elements (Bengtsson and 
Kock, 2000; Mayasandra et al., 2006; Stadtler and Wassenhove, 2016). Bengtsson and Kock’s 
(2000) study of ‘coopetition’ illustrates the creation of departments that focus on either 
competitive or cooperative strategies. Further, information technologies make it possible to 
minimize communication and task interdependence between separated teams whilst at the same 
time connecting them and supporting task integration (Dubé and Robey, 2009). Other studies 
suggest ‘time-bound’ separations – teams focusing on one strategy for a period before returning 
to attend to the other (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989). Although separation strategies may avoid 
conflict and instability, they sometimes ignore the potential of blending for turning 
disagreements into value-creation (Stadtler and Wassenhove, 2016; Johansen, 2018). Overall, 
however, separation-based strategies dominate managerial efforts aimed at managing 
paradoxes  
The second, integration-based strategy, is less common and involves purposefully 
juxtaposing contradictory elements (Lewis, 2000; Lewis and Smith, 2011), thus seemingly 
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intensifying tensions. However, if managed effectively, such tensions can be turned into good 
collaborative outcomes. For instance, Dubé and Robey (2009) found how employing 
individuals with experience of handling ambiguous situations, maintaining shared calendars 
for transparency and establishing a common focus while acknowledging differences helped 
overcome structure-flexibility tensions. In well-managed integration scenarios, actors break 
out of vicious cycles and move away from defensive responses by acknowledging tensions and 
reframing them as necessary or accepting them as natural conditions of work. The process of 
recognizing and accepting inherent contradictions can provide actors with a sense of ‘freedom’ 
in “learning to live with” the opposing elements (Lewis, 2000: 764). They may embrace 
tensions, making small cognitive and behavioral adjustments to find benefits within the 
otherwise tense environment (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013; Jarzabkowski and Le, 2016). 
Integration-based strategies can encourage critical self-reflection, stimulate more ambivalent 
interpretations of surroundings (Lewis, 2000; Smith et al., 2017) and avoid oversimplification 
of problems (Plambeck and Weber, 2010).  
In summary, our synthesis of the literature suggests a paradoxical mindset (i.e., a 
readiness to embrace inherent contradictions) can help organizations find more accommodating 
solutions (Smith 2014; Bengtsson et al., 2016), improve organizational learning (Lewis 2000; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003), innovate more (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009), have higher 
problem solving capabilities and adapt better to change (Schuman et al., 2010), have successful 
inter-firm alliances and achieve overall superior performance (Rai, 2016). In terms of current 
research, we know a lot more about ‘why’ organizations strive for a paradoxical mind-set than 
‘how’ it is achieved (Stadtler and Wassenhove, 2016). In the specific context of GDW, there 
is limited understanding of how tensions can be turned into collaborative ways of working. 
Further, there is scarce research on the implications of interactions amongst different tensions 
for collaborative outcomes. In the following sections, we present the case of a distributed 
finance function, where work has been demarcated and distributed between two sides – onshore 
business units and an offshore shared service center. Using this case, we explain how the two 
sides negotiate tensions and explicate the role of a sequential enactment of both formal 
(integration-based) and informal managerial solutions in generating collaborative 
opportunities.  
Design and methods 
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Research approach 
We wanted our research approach to allow us to explore the potentially complex challenges 
onshore-offshore unit members face as they collaborate. In line with past research, we adopted 
the qualitative case study method (Walsham, 2006) which generates rich data and helps 
advance understanding of under-researched phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kotlarsky et al., 
2014). We drew predominantly on interview data from both onshore and offshore units to gain 
an in-depth understanding of the structural, as well as the social context of collaborative GDW. 
The findings report data that emerged organically from our interpretivist approach to data 
analysis.   
Research setting  
Our research is set in the finance function of a large global logistics firm made up of four 
business divisions. Our research focuses on the paradox emerging from the migration of 
financial tasks from several onshore country level business units (BUs) within the firm’s largest 
business division to an offshore shared service unit (SSU). Our empirical material provides 
retrospective accounts, triangulated with several data sources, to capture tensions across 
significant changes in organizational structure (Figure 1). Throughout the paper we refer to 
employees working in the SSU as ‘SSU members’ and employees working in BUs as ‘BU 
members’.  
Finance Organization Structure 1: Centralization of financial operations into GBS 
Figure 1: Finance function organizational structure 
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A centralization strategy, which began in 2008, aimed to consolidate resources from across the 
multiple country level business units (BUs). Tasks were transferred out of the BUs into a 
dedicated financial shared services unit (SSU), which sat within a wider corporate center called 
Global Business Services (GBS). In addition to finance, GBS provided a range of support 
services to the BUs including procurement, legal, HR and IT support. The idea of centralizing 
finance was to help BUs improve financial reporting, better manage financial risk and improve 
customer focused activities. For instance, it was anticipated that moving a range of activities 
into the SSU would give BU members more time to visit customers, better understand their 
financial and shipment needs, offer more tailored customer service and increase sales by 
generating larger shipping orders. The SSU focused on standardizing and delivering a range of 
financial operations to the BUs such as the purchasing and paying for goods and services. The 
BUs paid for the SSU’s services, which were governed via SLAs and performance was 
measured through key performance indicators (KPIs). During this period, BU members became 
increasingly dissatisfied with the service provided by the SSU. BU members were focused on 
being more responsive to customer queries and offering flexibility through shipment discounts 
and differentiated payment plans. SSU members, on the other hand, were focused on reducing 
the cost of finance and standardizing processes to gain efficiencies. In 2011, to achieve further 
cost savings, some transactional activities related to the invoicing provision were outsourced 
to a third-party provider. BU members saw this outsourcing arrangement as being at odds with 
their priorities and this view led to several BU-SSU disagreements. SSU members were also 
tasked with the long-term improvement of financial processes through standardization, 
integration of existing information systems and the implementation of new IT tools across 
multiple BUs. However, the BUs did not always have the funds to support these SSU 
objectives. Projects deemed to not have an immediate impact on BUs were often rejected by 
BU members who were more focused on their annual sales targets.  
 
Finance Organization Structure 2: SSU integration into Business Division 
In late 2014 the SSU’s reporting lines were changed and it was integrated into the business 
division. The SSU did not physically change location, and tasks remained centralized, but SSU 
members now reported to the business division rather than to GBS. As the SSU became 
integrated into the business division, BU and SSU members were expected to collaborate more 
closely to perform and improve distributed processes. Our data describes the tensions between 
the BUs (onshore units) and the SSU (offshore unit), given their conflicting objectives (see 
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Table 2), and explains the process of accommodating contradictory needs and creating 
collaborative opportunities.  
Data sources 
Data was collected in three rounds (see Table 3) in 2015–2016, mainly through in-depth 
interviews. Interviews focused on capturing retrospective accounts of the challenges 
participants faced as work was migrated into the SSU (focusing on 2008–2015), as well as 
accounts of the tensions participants faced as the finance function matured and transformed 
(2014–2016). The first round of interviews was conducted with SSU members at the offshore 
SSU head office in March 2015. With the help of an SSU manager, we selected participants 
from a range of management positions. (see Appendix for a complete list of positions and 
participant codes). The interviews were semi-structured and focused on ‘change’ and 
‘challenges’ participants faced in their work. They were asked to elaborate and give examples 
of ‘how’ and ‘why’ they thought situations or events occurred. The intention was to let 
interesting themes emerge from this first round of data collection, whilst developing a good 
understanding of the organizational structure and its evolution, and the distribution of work 
and challenges of GDW. The second round of interviews in January 2016 also took place at 
Table 2: Conflicting responsibilities and objectives of SSU and BUs 
 Shared Service Unit (SSU) Business Units (BUs) 
Objectives 
 
Reduce the cost of financial 
operations 
Long-term improvement of 
finance operations 
 
 
 
Improve financial position and customer 
service 
 
 
 
Tasks 
− Delivery of financial 
operations: purchase-to-
pay, record-to-report, 
order-to-cash 
− Standardize processes 
− Integrate and standardize 
information systems and 
information technology 
− Manage third-party 
provider 
− Meet internal and external audit requirements 
− Support regional and global finance 
organizations 
− Improve customer experience of financial 
processes 
− Improve the financial position of BU: projects 
to speed up processing of invoices 
− Support sales team to increase revenue: e.g., 
work out discounts for customers to 
encourage them to commit to larger shipments 
or move from other logistics providers 
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the SSU head office. Interviewees included managers from the SSU and the firm’s finance 
organization (FO) headquarters. The third round of interviews was conducted in June 2016 
with BU participants from four different onshore countries.  
Table 3: Rounds of data collection and nature of data collected 
Round Interviewees Interviews Focus  
1: March 
2015 
SSU 
members 9 
To understand the global 
organization of functions, 
changes in the role of the SSU 
and the corresponding 
challenges.  
2: January 
2016 
SSU and 
finance 
organization 
(FO) 
headquarters’ 
members 
8 
To understand tensions the 
SSU members face in their 
own work and in collaborative 
projects. 
To understand how SSU 
members cope with tensions. 
3: June 
2016 BU members 9 
To understand how BU 
members experience and cope 
with tensions in their own 
work and in collaborative 
projects. 
The interviews lasted between 60 and 140 minutes, averaging 77 minutes and amounting to 
about 33 hours of interview data. All but three (teleconference) interviews were conducted 
face-to-face. We collected several other documents, including annual reports, internal 
communications, performance dashboards, employee opinion surveys and employee 
development initiatives. These documents helped understand the chronology of structural and 
organizational changes and offered additional insights into the behaviors of onshore-offshore 
members. We also spent time in the offices, spoke informally with several participants, took 
photographs of the working environment and produced field notes. 
Data analysis  
We took the opportunity to organize and analyze data at each round of data collection. First, 
we transcribed all interviews from round one, studied the data, and made extensive notes to 
identify emerging themes of each interview individually. Second, we combined the interview 
data with documentation and field notes. This helped us to map the organizational structure, 
reporting lines, workflow and responsibilities, objectives and performance metrics. Third, we 
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set about identifying common themes across the complete round one dataset. To this end, we 
wrote short guiding narratives and constructed a table of themes. The presence of opposing 
objectives, the underlying power and knowledge asymmetries, and accounts of conflict 
between onshore (BUs) and offshore (SSU) units emerged organically from this round of 
interview data. We repeated this process for the second and third rounds of data collection. 
Data from the second round revealed in greater depth the conflicting objectives between the 
SSU and BUs and the apparent threats to participants’ sense of professional self. FO informants 
discussed the application of formal tools and ICT to resolve issues, and the process of 
integrating the SSU into the business division. Data from the third round, consisting of BU 
interviews, also referred to different work, objectives, and highlighted the differences in the 
perceived value of work performed onshore – in the BUs, and offshore – in the SSU. At the 
completion of three rounds of interviews, we made extensive notes and created a thematic table 
of onshore-offshore conflicts and tensions (e.g., Corley and Gioia, 2004) and their ongoing 
management by the FO headquarters. We then went back to the literature and iterated between 
theoretical explanations and the data until we were confident that our interpretation reached a 
reasonable level of theory-data alignment.  
Case Analysis 
Table 4 juxtaposes the perceptions of members from four onshore BUs with those from the 
offshore SSU to illuminate the specific paradoxical tensions in the relationship. In the analysis 
below, we show how members moved from defensive behaviors, which intensified tensions, to 
collaborative behaviors which attenuated them. We follow the analysis with a detailed 
discussion section.   
Tensions and defensive behaviors 
As summarized in Table 4, contrasting objectives, differing levels of knowledge and access to 
key decision makers, and issues of identity created tensions between the SSU and the BUs. 
SSU members noted that they struggled to coordinate and control information because of the 
BUs’ reluctance to share business knowledge. This restricted access meant that the SSU was 
not able to fully understand the BUs’ requirements. SSU members also explained that they did 
know enough about the activities performed by the third-party provider, which further limited 
their ability to support the BUs. When explaining their weak knowledge position, SSU 
14 
 
members noted that they were seen as a ‘cost center’ (i.e., the SSU did not directly generate 
revenue or make a profit and was instead perceived to cost the firm money). They reported that 
their position within the GBS, which was widely seen as a support service, had created a kind 
of status asymmetry between BU and SSU members. SSU members said that because they 
were support services, they were perceived as less capable, of less value, and as having different 
objectives to their BU counterparts. SSU members suggested they received limited financial 
investment and were unable to allocate resources needed to fully understand the activities 
performed in the BU, or to manage the third-party provider. In addition, despite being tasked 
with ‘process improvement’, they did not have the authority to implement new IT tools. Both 
BU and SSU members acknowledged the tensions as they transitioned towards a more 
centralized structure.  
The business was always run in a very entrepreneurial way. The BUs were very 
autonomous. Then suddenly you have this central support unit (GBS) that says the BU 
are going to do it totally differently. (P1.1)  
Several members referred to the disparity between BU and SSU decision-making power. While 
the SSU was given the responsibility to centralize and improve financial processes, senior 
managers in the SSU suggested that they did not have the “stick” or “the backing” from the 
finance organization (FO) headquarters to force BU members to accept process changes and 
new IT tools. They highlighted problems of knowledge and control, referring to the relationship 
as “artificial” (P2.1), with “virtual” (P1.2) and “psychological barriers” (P2.3; P2.7). They also 
felt they were treated like “suppliers” (P2.4) despite being internal to the firm. A senior SSU 
manager recalled a humiliating experience where the BU had dismissed plans to develop a 
financial process and suggested that they “needed to have somebody from the business division 
looking into it” (P2.4).  
From the BUs’ perspective, they were legally accountable to external auditors for 
financial documents produced by SSU members. They were also accountable to the business 
division for the quality of financial reporting, and to their customers for service quality. BU 
members felt this accountability was at odds with handing over control of related activities to 
the SSU. They did not have enough understanding of the SSU’s activities to be able to generate 
the necessary reports or rectify mistakes. BU members also felt that the SSU’s emphasis on IT 
standardization was in sharp contrast to the BUs’ focus on flexibility. For instance, a BU 
member explained that their team’s daily plan, which they referred to as a “living thing”, was 
devised on a whiteboard and adapted throughout the day. Others noted that they frequently had 
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to respond to urgent calls from customers and requests for information from senior managers. 
BU members saw the SSU as a “middleman” between themselves and the third-party provider 
who processed invoices. They felt this arrangement made accessing information and 
responding to customers more complex and time consuming. In addition, they questioned the 
SSU’s ability to control and manage information and to improve financial processes. They 
highlighted the strategic importance of their own work and saw the SSU as the “poorer 
cousin…who got the bad stuff” (P3.5). On the other hand, SSU members felt unhappy at being 
perceived as merely a “cost saving entity” (P2.4) created to perform “transactional”, 
“repetitive” and “back-office” work. They argued that such a view was not a true reflection of 
their ability to perform and improve processes. Many of them held master’s degrees and formal 
accounting qualifications and argued that their low status in the relationship was unjustified.  
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Table 4. Paradoxical tensions in GDW 
Source of tensions  
SSU’s perceived 
tensions SSU supporting data 
BUs’ perceived 
tensions BU supporting data 
Knowledge 
Asymmetries in 
process, domain 
and business 
knowledge 
Need to coordinate 
activities but have 
limited understanding 
of customer business 
and third-party 
provider activities 
The operations do not sit with 
us anymore, so it is difficult to 
have detailed conversations 
about an invoice that went 
totally belly up and why that 
was. (P1.9) 
There were specialities and 
local needs in BUs that we 
didn't know about. There were 
huge complexities in BUs in 
terms of systems, IT 
differences and processes. 
(P2.5) 
It’s not that everybody’s 
hiding information but to call 
220 countries and 
representatives in a tight time 
frame is not easy. (P1.2) 
Have a detailed 
understanding of own 
business and end 
customer needs but have 
limited understanding of 
wider processes. 
Need to access 
information on an 
informal basis but are 
reliant on formal 
systems to improve 
processes and increase 
objectivity. 
When they (the customer) have an 
information need it’s always 
urgent. (P3.9) 
There’s a disconnect. First, there’s 
a large gap between the SSU and 
the customer. Second, they don’t 
just have one BU to manage. When 
it was in-house, we were in control. 
Now we are one of many the SSU 
serve. (P.2.3) 
Power 
Asymmetries in 
authority and 
status 
Have limited access to 
decision makers and 
resources. Seen as a 
cost-center. 
Need to reduce costs 
and produce 
efficiencies but do not 
have the authority or 
BUs wouldn’t follow the 
standard processes. They had 
their own rules, their own 
ideas, and were continuously 
questioning us. They agree in 
principle but say “it’s not 
possible for us” because of 
whatever reason. (P1.6). 
Need to ensure the 
quality of outcomes but 
are expected to hand 
over control of 
processes. 
The decision power should always 
lie with us in the BU. Transactional 
work or data gathering can be with 
them. (P3.9) 
Control should sit with the person 
responsible for the end impact. Our 
CFO is responsible for his Profit 
and Loss (and not the SSU). (P3.3) 
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the financial resources 
to make changes. 
If a BU CFO said ‘no I don’t 
see that happening’ then it 
didn’t happen. We are a just a 
cost-centre. (P1.2) 
If we wanted to implement 
something it was seen as a 
huge one-off cost to the BUs. 
They always said that they 
only want to do projects that 
pay back in two years or less. 
There’s not much we can do 
then. (P1.1) 
 
Identity Threats to sense 
of belonging 
Identify strongly with 
the organization but 
feel that they (SSU) 
are treated like 
external suppliers. 
Need to collaborate 
with BUs. But they 
(SSU) are focused 
solely on broad 
organizational 
objectives, which the 
BUs find hard to relate 
to. 
Us and them dynamic. (P2.6) 
The BUs were autonomous. As 
they were making profits, they 
could do what they 
wanted…they didn’t 
appreciate us. (P1.1) 
Acknowledge the SSU 
but feel that external 
units should not tell the 
BUs what to do. 
Need to collaborate with 
the SSU, but struggle to 
accept the SSU as a 
same-status partner. 
The SSU was the poorer cousin who 
got the bad stuff. (P3.5) 
You (have to) end up with a 
supplier-vendor relationship. 
(P1.5) 
The SSU is seen more as a cost 
driving entity and the value driving 
entity, the business, is separate. By 
definition you are classifying a 
group of people as a cost. (P2.4) 
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Defensive behaviors 
SSU members claimed that the BUs actively resisted their (SSU’s) efforts to standardize IT 
processes. BU members explained their resistance in terms of the rigidity the SSU initiatives could 
impose on the BUs’ everyday work and on the BUs’ freedom to make local adaptations. SSU 
members explained that BUs invoked the contractual nature of their relationship with the SSU to 
reject initiatives which aimed at further standardizing financial processes. These projects tended 
to be rejected because of the perceived cost. 
The first question was always “What is it going to cost and what is going to be the impact 
on my SLA? They were saying ‘I only want to do projects that pay back in two years or 
faster’. There’s not much you can do… it just doesn’t work. (P1.1) 
Some SSU members explained that BU resistance was often supported by the business division, 
which did not enforce centralized process changes.  
In the past if we challenged a process, we had nobody we could go to. If the BU didn’t 
want to change, then they didn’t change. The business division did not support our 
projects. We were there to deliver a service and that service could only be what the local 
BU ‘needed’. We’ve never had that backing. (P2.1) 
To access information quickly, BUs often avoided standardized formal processes and contacted 
the third-party provider directly. Although this meant that issues were resolved locally, deeper and 
more fundamental issues with the process were not flagged or fixed.  
I jump the gun and go to the [provider] to get a quick answer so I can quickly feedback 
to my manager. When it’s to do with you, you’re willing to jump any hoops to quickly 
resolve your issue. (P3.5) 
From the SSU’s perspective, these BU behaviors restricted their ability to perform their own roles 
effectively. One SSU member explained: 
We were under continuous pressure to drive costs down. At the same time BUs were not 
allowing us to change and to optimise the process which would allow us to decrease costs! 
It’s an interesting 'spagaat' [translation: splits] - cost reductions on one side and on the 
other side not being allowed to change the process. (P1.9) 
The SSU responded by trying to limit communication exchanges between the BUs and the third-
party provider. For instance, SSU members improved formal documentation to reduce the need 
for direct communication. They kept ‘log books’ to record all mistakes, process delays and 
complaints from BU members. SSU members also tried to force BUs to use formal protocol and 
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communication channels by boycotting deviations and not completing work that did not align with 
the standard format.   
Someone will phone up or send an email saying ‘can you add this’ and we say ‘no you’re 
not going to do that. You are going to send the form’. Often, we have implemented an IT 
tool they need and we make it stricter - and god that’s something we want. We want to 
improve the controls. (P1.5) 
The SSU also focused on the formal terms of their contracts with BUs in order to emphasize the 
obligations of all parties. SSU members invoked SLAs and statement of work documents, to 
reiterate the specific roles and objectives of the BUs, the third-party provider and the SSU. 
However, both BU and SSU members referred to SLAs (and the focus on contractual obligations) 
as one of the biggest collaborative challenges. BU members pointed out that SLAs codified the 
misaligned objectives between themselves and the SSU – cost reduction for the SSU and service 
quality for the BUs. They noted that the SSU, BUs and the third-party provider were rewarded 
through financial bonuses for meeting conflicting objectives. The SSU’s bonuses were linked to 
cost savings and efficiencies, the BUs’ to improving financial outcomes for the unit, and the third-
party provider’s bonuses were based on the number of invoices processed. They used the terms set 
out in the SLAs to defend their own objectives and bonuses. BUs showed their discontent with the 
SSU’s inflexibility by issuing ‘red SLAs’ to signal that obligations had not been met. SSU 
members countered with ‘blue SLAs’ to justify their own actions, noting that the BUs had not 
provided the information needed for the SSU to fulfill its obligations. BU members felt that the 
SSU had developed a “fighter’s mentality” (P2.6) and that the two sides became stuck in blaming 
contests and “stalemate” conversations about SLAs. At the same time, some BU members admitted 
that they found it challenging to hand over control of tasks they had earlier performed themselves. 
 
Table 5: Defensive behaviors and impact on tensions 
SSU defensive behaviors BU defensive behaviors Tensions 
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Negotiating tensions 
In order to better align SSU’s service provision with the needs of the BUs, the finance organization 
(FO) headquarters altered the organizational structure (Figure 1: Finance Organization Structure 
2). The SSU was structurally removed from GBS and integrated into the business division. Beyond 
the structural change, there was a conscious effort to break “psychological barriers” and integrate 
the SSU into the division. Senior managers overseeing the transition made it clear that they did not 
want the structural change to be seen as a “hostile takeover” of the SSU by the division, but only 
as a means for the BUs and the SSU to “come together”. They actively emphasized “togetherness” 
in their communications and referred to “putting pieces of the puzzle back together” and “working 
as one” (P2.6; P2.1; P2.5). The business division held a “welcome” event as a starting point for 
their new unity. One BU member said:  
We held a small celebration with them (the SSU). You feel that people are more engaged 
to deliver the best they can, not just because we gave them a glass of prosecco and a 
couple of candies, but because we tell them: “Look, what you guys are doing is really 
important”. We show them the value in what they’re doing, and they see their full 
contribution to the network. Through the network you’re part of the family. (P.3.9) 
 
Interactive behaviors 
The structural integration resulted in BU and SSU members being involved in more joint 
management meetings, joint service performance reviews (SPRs), and collaborative improvement 
projects. BU and SSU members reported that working together in this way was often more difficult 
than working independently. They found these meetings involved “uncomfortable” and “frank 
discussions”. BUs also introduced a service ‘health check’ which rated service provision on a 
traffic light system (green - good, red – bad, and amber - requires improvement). Unlike formal 
Emphasized the separation of 
responsibilities  
 
Enforced IT standardization 
 
Focused rigidly on contracts 
and SLAs 
Worked around formal 
channels to access 
information  
 
Resisted IT standardization 
 
Monitored and escalated even 
extremely minor violations of 
contractual obligations  
Amplified 
Tensions made more 
severe as both sides 
reach a “stalemate” 
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performance indicators and SLAs these health checks focused on more informal measures such as 
sentiment and feelings.  
Health checks gives a sense of how BU members are feeling about performance. For 
example, in November the UK BU felt there was just too much change. So it’s not based 
on any poor performance - they just found the new IT tools overwhelming. The UK BU is 
big, so if there are new tools then a lot of people have to be trained... Norway was red but 
now it has gone to amber. They were unhappy about duplicate entries coming from a new 
tool. That is now gone but they kept it amber just for monitoring. They had no issues but 
just didn’t feel confident about it. (P2.1) 
Some results were disputed, leading to heated discussions. A BU member described a difficult 
exchange with the SSU: 
With this new focus on quality, and them being in the business division the standard wasn’t 
okay anymore. We needed big improvements, so we introduced a traffic light system for 
reporting. I can tell that it’s been contentious. It’s important to the SSU and we suddenly 
made them red when it had always been green. I could really sense some negative emotion 
about that. The service hadn’t got worse it’s just that we hadn’t set the target high enough 
before. At the end of a call with them they said: “Is it green as usual?” and we said, “No. 
It’s red”. It was the wrong way to do it, but we have to work together and clean it up. 
(P3.3) 
However, BU and SSU members noted that while meetings led to uncomfortable discussions and 
blame passing, they also provided opportunities to better understand their counterpart’s needs, 
confront them on issues, and to defend their own positions. As an SSU member explained: 
They say how they feel and they usually give examples to explain issues. We give the    
reasons and we give what actions we are taking. (P2.1)  
A BU member explained that the increased interactions helped them empathize with the SSU: 
I do see the problem for SSU. If they’re not being included in the process, then they can’t 
perform their job properly. Can you imagine if they were on a call with the BU CFO and 
they said, “No problems, everything’s kosher, everything’s running perfectly,” but the 
CFO’s got a long list of all the problems that have come to him directly? The SSU look 
bad but in reality they have not been given the visibility to do it! (P3.5) 
Similarly, SSU members reported that they became more tolerant of the BUs’ challenges: 
BUs do not want to get complaints from their suppliers about delayed payments. One BU 
in particular gets heat for that so we have to make sure that doesn’t happen. (P2.1) 
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Several BU and SSU members explained that an important consequence of “coming together” was 
the easing of perceived “process boundaries”. They acknowledged that collectively they would 
perform better if they integrated individual tasks and shared knowledge to develop new ideas. In 
the new collaborative environment, the BUs also felt that the SSU was ready to go beyond its 
formal obligations and work closely with the BU members to gain relevant business knowledge. 
Rather than just taking its narrow operational scope - working faster, harder, cheaper - 
the SSU actually had to collaborate with what’s before and after them in the process. 
They’re really making a difference now and it creates opportunity. The fences have gone 
down. It means that they now frequently cross borders and understand more about what 
happens in the other parts of the organization. (P2.6) 
 
Collaborative behaviors 
SSU members started to take a more collaborative view of their responsibilities and reflect on how 
their own actions impacted the larger organization. They spoke about picking their battles carefully 
and explained that they had become better aligned with the BUs’ need for flexibility. As they 
increased their interactions, the focus on imposing rigid controls diminished significantly. One 
SSU member gave an example of a new online invoicing tool designed to require less manual input 
from the SSU when collecting payments. The idea was to speed up invoice processing times so 
that BUs received their customer payments quicker to improve cash flow. The implementation of 
the tool required the BUs to align their own systems and encourage their customers to adopt the 
online method of payment. The SSU’s business plan aimed for 80% of invoices to be processed 
Table 6: Interactive behaviors and impact on tensions 
SSU Interactive Behaviors BU Interactive Behaviors Tensions 
Worked to develop   
knowledge of BU operations 
 
Attended management   
meetings with the BUs 
 
Empathized with BUs 
 
 
Focused on less 
confrontational and informal 
indicators of performance  
 
Attended management  
meetings with the SSU 
 
Empathized with SSU teams 
 
Accommodated 
Tensions were acknowledged 
and accommodated as both 
sides related better to each 
other’s needs 
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through the new invoice system. However, SSU members understood and empathized with the 
problems the BUs faced in adopting the tool. For instance, not all customers were able to access 
online payment systems. SSU members discussed the problems with their BU counterparts and 
agreed to aim for a more realistic 70%, which would allow for the local adaptations required by 
BUs to accommodate customers. 
When you have exceptions, escalations or urgent issues we can now work with SSU 
members to see how we can overcome them and what our options are. It is a much 
smoother process. Of course, the SSU has to comply with policy - so in the BUs we try to 
operate as much as possible within standard processes. But in emergencies we have some 
temporary flexibility. (P3.8) 
BU members also engaged in more collaborative behaviors. They referred to an internal “change 
in attitude” and began to encourage their SSU counterparts to make their own decisions and 
propose “improvement projects”.  
In the past they were treated as subordinates. I think they just kept their heads down 
because they were so scared of getting things wrong. No one raised any issues, and no 
one ever came to me in case they’d have their heads bitten off. They now feel empowered 
to look for things. They’ll talk to me and they’ll suggest something. Nine times out of ten 
I’ll say “What a brilliant idea. Let’s do it”. (P3.4) 
SSU members noted that the BUs were more welcoming of new initiatives and were proactively 
approaching the SSU with ideas for improving their collaboration. SSU members explained they 
felt energized and put in more effort to share knowledge, ideas, and implement new IT tools. For 
instance, an SSU member who managed the ‘purchase-to-pay’ area, implemented a set of global 
KPIs to align and reconcile the goals, objectives and expectations of the BUs, the SSU and the 
third-party provider:  
With the global KPIs there has been a shift from a pure processing focus (how many 
invoices have we processed?) to a real end-to-end view. Now, everybody needs to 
understand the tools [e.g. TradeShift and Basware]. In the SSU we need to see end-to-end 
if there are any issues and where they are coming from. This means going over the borders 
of our own unit, to the BU, and even towards procurement. (P2.4) 
Several BU and SSU members explained that while the integration process had been challenging, 
it had led them to engage in more collaborative decision-making. The “psychological divide” 
between the SSU and the BUs had reduced, and the decision-making process had become faster. 
The SSU stopped complaining about the BUs’ systematic resistance to change, and the BUs 
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stopped opposing SSU initiatives. The confrontational approach was replaced by collaborative 
discussions and negotiations. The SSU continued to be responsible for cost reduction and process 
standardization. The BUs continued to be “customer-centric” in their financial decisions but 
worked collaboratively with the SSU. The BUs acknowledged that the SSU’s work on cost 
reductions and process efficiencies was enabling them (the BUs) to focus squarely on improving 
their customers’ experience.  
In the past a lot of the project change capacity was all focused on driving down cost.  Now 
that capability is there for the BUs, but the CFO can easily say “Hey guys, let’s park the 
cost project or the standardization in Asia for a little bit, and focus on this commercial 
one that has a revenue and customer satisfaction impact”. This is now possible! In the 
past there would be reiterations and reiterations on the SLA impact and the budget. All 
that stuff has gone. (P2.6) 
While formal objectives did not change, the BU and SSU developed new ways of coping with 
tensions and working with one-another to find collaborative solutions. In accommodating one 
another, both BU and SSU members made practical trade-offs. For example, the SSU decided to 
reduce focus on cost reduction projects and increase focus on customer experience projects. 
Similarly, the BUs volunteered to improve compliance with formal SSU processes. Both sides 
realized that not sharing knowledge was detrimental to achieving smooth distributed processes. 
Rather than prioritizing their own objectives, they worked on understanding one-another’s tasks 
as important components of a bigger picture. BUs empowered the SSU to make decisions in the 
larger interest of the organization even when such decisions made their own (BUs) work 
temporarily more challenging. SSU members engaged with BU members actively in the decision-
making process. Overall, both sides explained that process performance had improved in terms of 
both efficiency (cost and speed) and quality (accuracy and customer service).  
 
Table 7: Collaborative behaviors and impact on tensions 
SSU Collaborative Behaviors BU Collaborative Behaviors Tensions 
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Discussion 
The analysis above illustrates several inherent paradoxes in GDW. In particular, it shows how 
onshore-offshore collaborations involve opposing values and objectives and intense competition 
for resources and decision-making power. This analysis builds on extant literature which has 
identified three prominent sources of tensions in GDW – knowledge asymmetries (Oshri et al., 
2008; Hahl et al., 2016), power asymmetries (Levina and Vaast, 2008; Ravishankar et al., 2013) 
and identity threats (Petriglieri, 2011; Koppman et al., 2016). In our case, the three tensions were 
most evident in the relationship between onshore BU units and the offshore SSU unit. While 
previous studies have acknowledged tensions and the conflict they create as a pertinent issue, thus 
far there has been very little understanding of how tensions can be turned into opportunities for 
effective collaborative practices. Further, only scant research has considered the interactions 
amongst tensions and how they play out in GDW. Drawing on our analysis and guided by ideas 
from paradox theory (Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011), we offer three contributions to the 
literature on GDW.  
− First, we illuminate how a sequential enactment of formal and informal solutions may help 
address tensions and generate more effective onshore-offshore collaborative practices in 
GDW. 
In the literature, tensions and their manifestations have been viewed as being either value-
destroying or value-creating. Symptoms of value-destroying tensions in GDW include a lack of 
Reduced their demands for 
standardization 
 
Supported the creation of flexibility 
 
 Shared knowledge and ideas to 
support BUs 
 
Engaged in collaborative decision- 
making 
 
Empowered SSU to 
propose new projects 
 
Engaged in collaborative 
decision-making 
 
Relinquished control of 
some processes 
 
Attenuated 
Tensions were less 
salient as both sides 
learned to live with 
them. They worked to 
align goals and bridge 
misunderstanding. 
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ability and willingness to share knowledge (Zimmerman and Ravishankar, 2014), poor integration 
across distributed process (Levina and Vaast, 2008) and growth of ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups (Hinds et 
al., 2014). Symptoms of value-creating tensions include better integrated activities and acceptance 
and accommodation of ambivalent situations and contradictions (Lewis, 2000; Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003; Johansen, 2018). Our findings go beyond viewing tensions in binary terms. They 
help explain how instability-generating tensions (i.e., value-destruction) in GDW can turn into an 
energizing catalyst and create opportunities for creativity and innovation (i.e., value-creation). As 
we elaborate below, in our case formal structural integration that seemingly intensified paradoxical 
tensions also led the SSU and the BUs to confront paradoxes directly and move towards more 
effective collaborative practices.  
The SSU had adopted defensive behaviors such as ‘working to rule’, hiding information, and 
excessively emphasizing the need to follow processes. On the other side, the BUs leveraged their 
superior power position to resist change, access information directly from the third-party provider 
and force flexibility. These behaviors widened the relational gulfs, increased knowledge 
asymmetries and further reinforced the power imbalances and conflicting objectives. As prior 
research has shown, such defensive behaviors are frequently used to mute or disguise tensions and 
avoid ‘paralyzing’ conflict (Lewis, 2000; Ravishankar et al., 2013). They also ignore the practical 
effort required to make collaborations work, and can therefore lead to diminished opportunities for 
better understanding the GDW partner (Levina and Vaast, 2008). Interestingly, the structural 
separation of the SSU and the BUs – with the SSUs reporting to the GBS and the BUs reporting 
to the business divisions (see Figure 1) – and the systems used to make this uncoupling work, 
further exacerbated the paradoxical tensions. As our analysis shows, the two sides were unwilling 
to cooperate outside of formal obligations and share knowledge with one another and were prone 
to fiercely protecting their own positions. We would therefore suggest that simple formal solutions 
(e.g., structural separation of units) may not resolve the paradoxical tensions inherent in GDW. 
They can be too formulaic to tackle the inherent paradoxes and additionally, may fail to recognize 
opportunities to generate new collaborative practices from the paradoxical tensions. Equally, as 
the literature points out, standalone informal coping strategies such as arriving at blatantly 
stereotypical ‘cultural’ understandings of the GDW partner’s actions may not resolve tensions 
either. They may in fact hinder collaboration and create bigger relational challenges in the long 
run (Ravishankar, 2015).  
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However, our case suggests that when actors are given the chance to confront paradoxical 
tensions directly through a careful sequential enactment of both formal and informal solutions, it 
is conceivable that this will help address tensions and develop more effective collaborative 
practices. As our analysis shows, structural integration of the SSU and BUs – a formal solution – 
created proximity and forced both sides to share time and space, triggering a series of informal 
positive interactive behaviors such as frank discussions, empathy for offshore (onshore) 
counterparts, and demonstrations of better awareness of the paradoxical roots of their collaborative 
activities. In other words, both sides identified and negotiated relational challenges, and sought to 
address knowledge and power imbalances and align objectives. While these interactions were often 
described as uncomfortable, they energized both sides to develop new collaborative ways of 
working. For instance, our informants explained how ‘new’ joint meetings and frank discussions 
improved the speed of decision-making, led to greater knowledge sharing and empowered them to 
generate new IT tools for ‘process improvement’. The key turning point for the emergence of 
collaborative behaviors was the actions taken by senior managers (i.e. BU CFOs) in overseeing 
the structural integration of the BUs and SSU2. The integration retained the physical separation of 
the SSU and BUs but eliminated the structural separation. BU CFOs paid close attention to 
reducing the power and identity tensions, explaining to the SSU members that they were highly 
valued, and that the integration was an opportunity to work with the BUs as same-status partners. 
Thus, they provided both sides (esp. the SSU) a sense of psychological security to approach the 
integration with positive hope, rather than with worry and fear. This line of thought complements 
arguments in paradox theory which suggest that squarely facing up to opposing elements, albeit 
informally, within a safe and formally constructed space, helps mitigate tensions through better 
awareness and appreciation of mutual positions (Smith and Lewis, 2011; Smith, 2014). In this 
sense, confronting instead of avoiding may help turn potentially value-destroying tensions into 
opportunities for value creation (Johansen, 2018). There is a key insight here for the management 
of distributed teams, which often relies on distance to temper relationships and maintain stability: 
With an optimal combination of formal and informal solutions, tensions can be managed to 
improve relationships and encourage collaborate practices in GDW.  
 
2 We thank anonymous Reviewer 2 for this insight. 
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− Second, based on our analysis we have developed a phasal model which helps explain the 
evolution and management of tensions in GDW.  
 
Tensions evolve with onshore-offshore exchanges. Specifically, our empirical data shows how 
tensions are suppressed, amplified, accommodated and attenuated in globally distributed 
collaborations (see Figure 2). Tensions evoke defensive behaviors and evolve in response to the 
behaviors. For instance, SSU’s enforcement of formal communication channels compelled BUs to 
find alternative flexible ways to access information, thus further amplifying tensions. The 
structural integration of the SSU into the business division meant that both sides had to squarely 
face the tensions and negotiate differences. The SSU and BUs moved from defensive behaviors, 
which suppressed and then amplified tensions, to more positive interactive behaviors through 
which they learned (at least temporarily) to ‘live with’ and accommodate tensions (Smith and 
Lewis, 2011). As explained earlier, this process of coming together enabled both sides to better 
understand the other’s perspectives and empathize with the other’s motives. Informal meetings led 
to workarounds, compromises and collaborative behaviors, thereby attenuating tensions.  
Our data also suggests that given the inherent and entrenched nature of the paradoxical 
elements, any resolution or attenuation of tensions may only be temporary. Our informants noted 
that as situations changed, for example when new activities migrated to the SSU or new members 
joined the team, tensions re-emerged, requiring further renegotiation in search of an amicable 
Figure 2: Phasal model of tensions in GDW 
29 
 
solution. As both sides recognized the importance of dedicating time for honest and regular 
communication over thorny issues, monthly service performance review meetings and regular 
health checks were established. Thus, building on our phasal model, we suggest that at the heart 
of managing inherent tensions in GDW is the ongoing negotiation of amicable and ‘best fit’ 
solutions at that time.   
− Third, we extend prior research by empirically illustrating the interactions of tensions. 
Our analysis brought to light interactions amongst knowledge, power and identity tensions, which 
have been largely implicit in current debate. Only a small set of studies have hinted at interactions 
of knowledge-power-identity tensions in GDW. For instance, Hahl et al. (2016) imply such 
interactions in their study of knowledge asymmetries between teams and brokers when they 
highlight the ‘esteem’ of those brokering as an important influence on teams’ willingness to share 
knowledge and reduce asymmetries. Similarly, Levina and Vaast (2008) refer to the status of teams 
as an important facet of knowledge sharing and innovation in GDW, while Zimmermann and 
Ravishankar (2011) argue that asymmetrical status positions influence the professional role 
identities of offshore-onshore units. Overall however, interactions between knowledge, power, and 
identity tensions have not been explicitly considered or illustrated in prior GDW research. Our 
analyses point to such interactions and their importance for effective collaboration.  
 
Defensive behaviors and interaction of tensions 
In the suppression-amplification phases (see Figure 2), the SSU tried to strengthen its weaker 
power-identity position in the relationship (being perceived as a ‘transactional’ ‘poorer cousin’ 
with limited access to decision makers, less investment and limited authority to enforce process 
changes) by asserting its stronger knowledge position and insisting that the BUs use formal 
systems for information exchanges. Such an emphasis on its knowledge position amplified the 
knowledge tensions between the two sides (Table 5). Thus, we would suggest that against a 
background of defensive behaviors efforts to reduce power and identity tensions in GDW can 
further aggravate knowledge tensions.  
In turn, BUs attempted to maintain their stronger power-identity position and distract attention 
away from their weaker knowledge position. They emphasized their status as profit centers and 
their ‘customer’ proximity to ignore SSU mandates about the use of formal systems: The decision 
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power should always lie with us in the BU. Transactional work or data gathering can be with them 
(P3.9). This behavior not only created further knowledge tensions by hiding important business 
information from the SSU team, but also reinforced the power and identity tensions. Extrapolating 
from these observations, we would suggest that against a background of defensive behaviors 
efforts to maintain power and identity tensions in GDW can exacerbate knowledge tensions and 
worsen power and identity tensions.  
Interactive-collaborative behaviors and interaction of tensions 
The accommodation-attenuation phases (see Figure 2) involved a transition to interactive and 
collaborative behaviors. As the analysis shows, BUs empowered their SSU counterparts and in 
return, the SSU reduced knowledge tensions by better integrating distributed knowledge and by 
sharing their ‘process’ knowledge. Thus, we would suggest that against a background of 
interactive-collaborative behaviors efforts to reduce power tensions in GDW can help reduce 
knowledge tensions. Several informants noted this improvement in the knowledge tension 
situation: The fences have gone down. It means that they now frequently cross borders and 
understand more about what happens in the other parts of the organization. (P2.6). 
The SSU also worked to improve their power position by offering more ‘valued’ services, 
which opened access to decision makers and financial resources. The SSU also started sharing 
knowledge with the BUs: …there has been a shift from a pure processing focus (how many 
invoices have we processed?) to a real end-to-end view (P2.4). The attenuation of power and 
knowledge tensions not only removed the hostility between teams, but (as described in the case 
analysis) but also had a positive impact on reducing identity tensions (e.g., the ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
barriers). Thus, we would suggest that against a background of interactive-collaborative behaviors 
efforts to reduce power and knowledge tensions in GDW can help reduce identity tensions. From 
a theoretical standpoint, these preliminary insights about how addressing one tension can 
potentially impact others calls for a greater focus on interactions amongst multiple tensions in 
distributed working environments. From a practical standpoint, it calls for more comprehensive 
and sophisticated strategies to manage tensions in GDW.   
Implications for paradox research and GDW practice 
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Thus far, studies of paradox have focused on a central actor who is challenged with 
accommodating two competing ideas (Lewis, 2000; Smith, 2014), such as novelty and usability 
(Miron-Spektor and Erez, 2017), innovation and efficiency (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009), and 
competition and cooperation (Rai, 2016). In all these cases, the actor is positioned as the focal 
point, facing two opposing forces. As a point of departure, here we have elaborated on how one 
side of the paradox (BUs) is at odds with the other side (the SSU). This viewpoint extends the 
somewhat traditional focus in the paradox literature on one central actor (or group) who can 
comprehend each opposing element individually, to include actors (e.g., onshore-offshore units) 
that are often unfamiliar with the specifics of one-another’s tasks, objectives, and values. Our 
analysis suggests that while formal strategies create a common lexicon and standardized rules for 
performing different parts of the distributed process, the inherently contradictory elements of the 
two GDW sides and the added complexity of distance mean that knowledge, power and identity 
tensions are harder to overcome. Our case suggests that organizations may need to take additional 
steps (e.g., structural realignments) to ensure that actors comprehend the inherently contradictory 
elements before attempting to engage in meaningful collaborative practices. Managers need to be 
sensitive, first and foremost, to the perceived power and identity tensions, which may amplify with 
the implementation of structural changes. They need to address the source of these tensions, by 
giving all sides the reassurance and confidence that their interests will be protected and by 
explaining the honest efforts being made to generate strategic value through the collaboration. The 
empirical material suggests that once individuals become better aware of, and empathize with, 
each other’s positions, the perception of power asymmetries and identity threats are likely to 
subside. In such a relatively benign environment, as we saw in our data, conflicting teams are 
likely to take concrete measures on their own to reduce knowledge tensions.  
The structural integration meant that the business division’s CFO became responsible for the 
BU and SSU teams and in many respects acted as the arbitrator. The success of this simplified 
hierarchical arrangement has two implications for practice. First, it indicates that even when teams 
are physically separate, having a common leader can help mitigate tensions. Second, it suggests 
that it may be crucial for such a leader, in the aftermath of the structural integration, to engage 
with the conflicting sides on a ‘human’ and ‘informal’ level rather than escalate the dependence 
on formal IT tools and systems. It is possible that many managers leading GDW relationship rely 
on formal IT tools to ease coordination and communication challenges, and to minimize or 
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overcome conflict. They may find this paper useful for designing or re-designing their 
management of distributed teams. Our study suggests that over-reliance on formal IT tools (e.g., 
the creation of a common lexicon and standardized processes) can be counterproductive. Instead, 
our findings suggest that organizations need to create opportunities for GDW teams to informally 
discuss, challenge, and negotiate power, knowledge and identity tensions in an open and 
transparent manner. One way in which organizations can support this may be to invest in platforms 
(online or offline) which offer GDW partners a safe space to engage in informal, and potentially 
constructive, meetings. However, a big challenge organizations face (and one that is admittedly 
not fully explored in this study) is understanding whether defensive behaviors stem from attempts 
to overcome inadequacies in the work system, or whether they are driven by the self-interest of 
actors taking short-cuts, resisting change and protecting their jobs. If it is mostly the former, then 
the challenge for managers is to balance the inherent paradoxes in a stable and coherent work 
system that fosters constructive GDW partnerships. If it is the latter, managers need to re-empower 
teams by better communicating the value of new (or evolving roles) and helping actors develop 
positive evaluations of their professional selves.   
Limitations and future research 
The arguments in this paper are based on a single in-depth case study. While this approach is 
consistent with the underlying principles and aims of qualitative research, care must be taken in 
transferring insights to other contexts. Another limitation of our study is that the data for phases 0 
and 1 (Figure 2) was captured retrospectively. We encourage scholars to adopt longitudinal 
methods to capture timely accounts of how multiple tensions evolve as GDW units collaborate 
over time. The collaborative behaviors we saw from both sides led to what some participants 
described as ‘small wins’. There was a better handling of trade-offs as both sides began working 
with each other. However, we acknowledge that managing trade-offs is not the ultimate objective 
here. Collaborative behaviors and better appreciation of mutual positions lay a solid foundation 
for genuine value creation through the offshore (SSU) – onshore (BUs) relationship. More research 
is needed to explicate the process of generating strategic value through collaborative behaviors in 
paradoxical GDW relationships. Our case focuses on inherent contradictions in the relationship 
between onshore BUs and an offshore SSU. However, it is likely that the corresponding tensions 
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could play out differently in different outsourcing and offshoring arrangements. Further research 
is needed to explore such variations. More work is also needed to understand how collaborative 
practices emerge as outsourcing/offshoring arrangements become more complex with the 
application of automation and artificial intelligence technologies.  
We have shown how even when they cannot entirely resolve the inherent contradictions in 
GDW, a sequence of formal and informal solutions can address the corresponding tensions and 
improve collaborative practices. However, it is possible that in some cases, a sequence of similar 
formal and informal solutions may worsen rather than improve opportunities for collaboration. 
Future research needs to closely investigate the range of conditions in GDW that invariably lead 
to negative manifestations of tensions and poor relationships. Our case featured a relationship 
between onshore BUs and an offshore SSU. However, we have not investigated in detail the extent 
to which geographic distance influenced the tensions. Indeed, some of the tensions may also appear 
in co-located and proximally located teams although distance obviously introduces a new 
dimension to the relationship. More research is needed to compare and contrast the influence of a 
wide array of possible geographic distances from onshore units (e.g., offshore - in the same 
continent; offshore - in a different continent) on the evolution of tensions in GDW. Finally, given 
that empirical research on paradox has so far largely restricted itself to contexts of equal power 
relations, there is a need for a more explicit focus on management of paradoxes in settings riddled 
with significant power asymmetries (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2017; Smith et al., 2017).  
Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have drawn on paradox theory in considering the intrinsic and entrenched nature 
of knowledge, power and identity tensions in GDW. While it may be hard to completely and 
conclusively reconcile the paradoxical elements underpinning GDW tensions, our study suggests 
that a sequential enactment of formal and informal solutions can help situated actors move towards 
better collaborative working practices with their GDW counterparts. Tensions in GDW evolve in 
phases and require a careful ongoing negotiation between diverse groups of stakeholders. 
Crucially, improvements in collaborative practices cannot be taken for granted since new demands, 
on say, an offshore unit may trigger new interactions amongst tensions and significantly harm the 
offshore unit’s relationship with its corresponding onshore unit. Thus, effective management of 
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paradox is a difficult and often fragile achievement in GDW settings. Given the increasing 
proliferation of GDW projects and initiatives, we would encourage scholars to build on our study 
and look closely into how specific interactions between tensions may be exploited to generate 
value for organizations engaged in GDW. 
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Appendix: Participant roles and data reference codes 
 
Round Participant Job Role 
Interview 
length 
(hours) 
Team Data Reference 
1 Transition and Transformation Manager for Europe 1:19 SSU P1.1 
1 Global Process Owner 1:31 SSU P1.2 
1 
General / Site Manager and 
Global Process Owner 
0:53 SSU P1.3 
1 Process Expert for Europe, the Middle East and Africa / Control Tower Lead 1:05 SSU P1.4 
1 Head of Transition and Transformation 1:12 SSU P1.5 
1 Transition and Transformation Project Manager 1:19 SSU P1.6 
1 Head of Learning and Development 1:27 SSU P1.7 
1 Global Deployment Manager 0:53 SSU P1.8 
1 Head of BPO 0:57 SSU P1.9 
2 Financial Accounting Manager 2:29 SSU P2.1 
2 
Head of Performance Management Europe & 
Global Coordinator for Performance 
Management 
1:09 SSU P2.2 
2 Acting Service Delivery Expert 1:18 SSU P2.3 
2 Global Process Owner 0:48 SSU P2.4 
2 Global Head of Financial Accounting 0:57 FO P2.5 
2 VP, HR for Finance 1:46 FO P2.6 
2 Communications & Employee Engagement Manager 1:29 SSU P2.7 
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2 Vice President, Provider Management 1:11 FO P2.8 
3 Chief Financial Officer: Country Level 0:52 BU P3.1 
3 Chief Financial Officer: Country Level 1:04 BU P3.2 
3 Head of Controlling: Country Level 1:34 BU P3.3 
3 Head of Governance: Country Level 1:10 BU P3.4 
3 Risk, Finance, and Reconciliation Controller: Country Level 1:03 BU P3.5 
3 Risk, Finance, and Reconciliation Controller: Country Level 1:11 BU P3.6 
3 Chief Financial Officer: Country Level 1:03 BU P3.7 
3 Chief Financial Officer: Country Level 1:33 BU P3.8 
3 Head of Commercial Controlling and OTC: Country Level 2:00 BU P3.9 
 
 
  
